Programme
Les présentations se feront en français ou en anglais.
Matinée | 9h-13h
> Cédric Patin | Aussi: does prosody matter?
(joined work with Sandra Benazzo & Laetitia Batjom)
Additive items like Fr. aussi share the possibility to occupy different positions in the sentence and to semantically affect different elements of it (König 1991). Their syntactic mobility partly indicates a variation in the particle scope, but does not always suffice to determine which element of the utterance is actually affected by the additive meaning: for instance, aussi placed after the finite verb can mark an addition on the object (Jean parle aussi [chinois]) as well as an addition on the subject ([Jean] parle aussi chinois). The aim of our study is to determine whether and to what extent prosody contributes to discriminate the meaning of sentences with aussi in structurally ambiguous positions in a more controlled context.
The talk will be held in French, but the slides are in English.
> Bert Cappelle | Conceptual blending: The apparent paradox paradox
Our use of expressions such as apparent paradox, false teeth, fake orgasm and the like seems to imply that there are objects which are and are not a certain thing. It will be argued that this apparent paradox paradox is only an apparent one. Drawing on insights from mental space theory, polyphony, conversational pragmatics and frame semantics, I will adopt and adapt a recent proposal of how best to deal with privative adjectives like fake, false and fictitious. A central notion in my account is that of perspective-taking, which may help us to solve a wide range of puzzling phenomena, including the problem of negative existentials, as in ``Unicorns do not exist", and possibly even the most fiendish of all paradoxes, the Liar paradox: ``This statement is not true".
> Mohammad Shafiei | A Phenomenological study of «Necessity» and a Dialogical Semantics for it
According to Husserl, modalities, like necessity and possibility, are first constituted as modifications of truth judgment. On the basis of this constitution, modal propositions can be formed. So, the question is: What is the nature of such modifications and what is the intention involved in modal propositions? Necessity is in general conceived in contrast to possibility. Investigating the phenomenology of possibility, one can see that there are different meanings of this notion. However, in this presentation I will claim that there is one basic meaning of necessity. In order to explain this, I will use the Leibnizian distinction between necessary and contingent truths.
Leibniz says that necessary truths are those that are derivable, through finite steps, from the fundamental truths, while the steps of derivation for the contingent truths are infinite. In this talk, I will explain necessity as finitely derivable from a set of canonical truths. Using this explanation I will give a dialogical semantic rule for necessity which leads to a logical system equal to intuitionistic S4. At the end, I briefly discuss the philosophical differences, and perhaps the potential advantages, of the introduced semantics and explanation in comparison to the well-known possible world semantics.
> Matthieu Fontaine | Contradiction et négation dans le contexte d'une dialogique adaptive
Présentation tirée d'un travail réalisé avec Mathieu Beirlaen (Ruhr Universität Bochum)
Les logiques paraconsistantes sont des logiques qui ne supportent pas l'explosion. Ces logiques présentent un certain intérêt pour l'analyse du discours scientifique et l'argumentation en général. Effectivement, des incohérences, ou contradictions, peuvent apparaître dans des théories ou au cours d'un processus argumentatif, sans que cela ne constitue une raison suffisante pour abandonner ces mêmes théories ou le processus d'argumentation en cours. L'apparition de telles incohérences ne constitue pas non plus une raison suffisante pour inférer n'importe quoi. Comment peut-on adapter le discours scientifique et l'argumentation à l'apparition d'incohérences?
Au cours de cette intervention sera présentée la logique dialogique IAD (inconsistency adaptive dialogical logic), une logique paraconsistante non monotone fondée sur la logique dialogique paraconsistante de Rahman & Carnielli (2000) et les logiques adaptives de Batens (2000). En plus de la présentation des règles, on discutera les avantages de IAD par rapport à d'autres approches des logiques paraconsistantes.
Références : Batens, D. 2000. "A Survey of Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics". In Batens, Priest and Van Bendegem (eds), Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic. Baldock: Research Studies Press, King's College Publications : 49-73 et Rahman, Sh. & Carnielli, W. 2000. "The Dialogical Approach to Paraconsistency". Synthèse, 125 (1-2) : 201-32.
Après-midi | 14h-17h30
> Gerhard Schaden | Communication, conventions and higher-order intentionality
(résumé à venir)
> Pierre Cardascia | Do you have a method ? - No, I have a strategy !
In Game Semantics, there is a classic motto: «sense is produced by the strategies». However, not many people outside GS (and even among philosophers) link philosophy and strategy together: philosophers are rather seen as men of method. Our talk will explore the tension between the two notions in order to explicit some requirements of our framework. In fact, a very common misunderstanding made about GS and about dialogical logics is that these theories do not fulfill their claims of dynamicity at the very level of semantics. To clean this interpretation, we have to refine the notion of strategy and divide it in two definitions (which can coincide in the case of the dialogical logic of matrices). The first one enables the connexion with the-now classical-semantic proofs by Nicolas Clerbout. The second one reaffirms the importance of dynamics in the dialogical analysis.
> Ilse Depraetere | Presentation of Drawing a line: perspectives on the semantics-pragmatics interface (editors: Ilse Depraetere and Raf Salkie, Springer, to appear)
In this talk, I will present the volume of papers, Drawing a line: perspectives on the semantics-pragmatics interface (Springer, to appear), co-edited by Ilse Depraetere and Raf Salkie. This will involve an overview of the structure of the book and a presentation of the aims and some of the major findings that have emerged from the papers.
The talk will be in English.
> Cristina Barés Gómez | The concept of Evidentiality
This talk focuses on a grammatical category called Evidentiality. The aim here is to conduct a conceptual study of evidentiality in which use is made of formal tools. Evidentiality is a dynamic notion to be analysed through the use of knowledge by the agents, a knowledge in action, which involves an in-coming state and an out-coming state that is typical of the transmission of information. I will begin with an overview of some well-known approaches. Then, I will discuss their advantages and their limitations. Thereafter, I will propose my own approach in which the dynamics of knowledge in action is grasped in the context of a Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL).
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